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Abstract
We study the quantitative properties of constrained e¢ cient allocations in an environ-
ment where risk sharing is limited by the presence of private information. We consider
a life cycle version of a standard Mirrlees economy where shocks to labor productiv-
ity have a component that is public information and one that is private information.
The presence of private shocks has important implications for the age proles of con-
sumption and hours. First, they introduce an endogenous dispersion of continuation
utilities. As a result, consumption inequality rises with age even if the variance of
the shocks does not. Second, they introduce an endogenous rise of the distortion on
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure over the life cycle.
This is because, as agents age, the ability to properly provide incentives for work must
become less and less tied to promises of benets (through either increased leisure or
consumption) in future periods. Both of these features are also present in the data.
We look at the data through the lens of our model and estimate the fraction of labor
productivity that is private information. We nd that for the model and data to be
consistent, all of the shocks to labor productivities must be private information.
JEL codes: D82, D91, D11, D58, D86, H21
Keywords: Private Information, Risk Sharing, Consumption Inequality.
We are grateful to Larry Jones and Patrick Kehoe for their continuous help and support. We thank Fab-
rizio Perri and Dirk Krueger for providing the CEX data. We thank Rajesh Aggarwal, Francesca Carapella,
V.V. Chari, Simona Cociuba, Roozbeh Hosseini, Mike Golosov, Katya Kartashova, Narayana Kocherlakota,
Erzo Luttmer, Ellen R. McGrattan, Fabrizio Perri, Chris Phelan, Anderson Schneider, Martin Schneider,
Chris Telmer, Pierre Yared, Warren Weber, participants at the SED meetings in Prague, LAEF conference
on dynamic political economy and optimal taxation and participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis bag lunch for comments and suggestions. Remaining mistakes are ours. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the
Federal Reserve System.
yContact Ales: ales@cmu.edu, Maziero: pricila@umn.edu.
1 Introduction
How well are workers able to smooth consumption and hours over their working life? Several
studies have shown that, at best, the level of insurance available to workers is imperfect.1
Given that the e¢ cient level of insurance prescribed by the complete markets model is in-
compatible with the data, in this paper we ask whether the observed data can be rationalized
as the outcome of a constrained e¢ cient allocation.
To answer this question, we study the quantitative properties of constrained e¢ cient al-
locations in a dynamic Mirrleesian environment where risk sharing is limited by the presence
of private information. Workers face idiosyncratic labor productivity risk throughout their
working lives, part of which is public information and part of which is private. The amount
of income insurance provided by the optimal contract depends on how large the private in-
formation component is. This enables us to draw a link between cross-sectional dispersion
observed in data and the amount of private information in our model. In the data, dispersion
in earnings and consumption rise with age while dispersion in hours worked declines. Look-
ing at the data through the lens of our model, we calibrate the amount of private information
needed for the model to be consistent with the data. Our model, calibrated to match these
facts, suggests that all of the variation in labor productivity arises from private-information
shocks.
Household data for the U.S. show that workers are subject to large income uctuations
over the working life and that these uctuations transmit only partially to consumption.2
Looking at the cross section, we observe that inequality in consumption is increasing over
age.3 At the same time, the prole for the cross-sectional variance in hours worked is slightly
decreasing over the working life. As shown in Cochrane (1991) and Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2001), these facts suggest that workers are partially insured against idiosyncratic
shocks.
The study of contractual arrangements that can explain the lack of full insurance is the
underlying motivation for Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas
(1992). These papers show that a repeated moral hazard environment with privately ob-
served taste shocks or endowments can qualitatively account for two key features observed
1See, for example, Cochrane (1991), Townsend (1994), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001), and
Attanasio and Davis (1996).
2See, for example, Cochrane (1991), Dynarski and Gruber (1997), and Gervais and Klein (2006). See
section 4 for details on the data.
3See, for example, Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005).
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in the data: consumption responding to income shocks and the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of consumption increasing over time. Our interest is in studying jointly the behavior
of consumption and hours; for this reason we focus on an environment where the source of
asymmetric information is the workers labor productivity, as in Mirrlees (1971) and Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003).
In our model, the allocation of consumption and hours along the working life is described
by an optimal incentive compatible contract. To prevent misreporting realized productivity
shocks, skilled workers are rewarded with higher current consumption and higher continua-
tion utility. The provision of incentives within the period (intratemporal distortion) trans-
lates to an increase in the covariance between consumption and labor productivity and a
decrease in the covariance between hours and labor productivity with respect to the uncon-
strained optimum. This reects the basic trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and incentives faced in
the optimal contract. As a consequence, over the working life the variance of consumption
increases and the variance of hours decreases as the intratemporal distortion increases.
As originally shown in Green (1987), the provision of incentives between periods intro-
duces an endogenous dispersion of continuation utilities. As a result, consumption inequality
rises with age even if the variance of the shocks does not. A key di¤erence in our environment
is the presence of a nite horizon in the optimal contract. This implies that the increase in
the dispersion of promised utility will be large early in life and will progressively slow down.
This is because, as workers age, the ability to properly provide incentives for work must
become less tied to promises of benets (through either increased leisure or consumption) in
future periods. As a consequence, the provision of incentives will progressively rely more on
the intratemporal distortion. This is the key mechanism that allows us to reconcile the pri-
vate information environment with the data: as the intratemporal distortion increases over
the working life, the cross-sectional variance of hours will remain at or decreasing while
the variance of consumption will continue to increase. This is in stark contrast to the case
where labor productivity is entirely public information. In this case, as shown in Storeslet-
ten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001), any increase in the cross-sectional variance of consumption
is followed by an increase in the cross-sectional variance of hours.
We solve the model numerically and use the simulated method of moments to determine
parameter values. Our targets are the variances of consumption and hours along the life cycle.
Our baseline estimated model can account for the increase in consumption inequality over
the working life and the slight decrease in the inequality in hours that we observe in the data.
In the calibrated model, 99% of the labor productivity shock is private information. The
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result is robust to di¤erent specications of the utility function, di¤erent target moments,
heterogeneity in initial promised utility levels, and persistence of the publicly observable
component of labor productivity.
Our paper is related to a growing literature that studies the distortions implied by the
optimal contract in dynamic versions of the original Mirrlees environment. The focus of
most of this literature is normative, looking at decentralization through taxes in environ-
ments where the government is the sole provider of insurance. Few papers have looked at
the empirical implications of the allocations of such constrained e¢ cient problems.4 Our
contribution with respect to this literature is to quantitatively characterize the allocation
and the distortions along the working life, highlighting the role of observables such as age
and the public component of labor productivity in the implied intratemporal distortions. In
addition, we show that the data display characteristics that we would expect to originate
from the optimal contract. This result raises the question, left for future research, of which
existing institutional arrangements implement the constrained e¢ cient allocation.
Papers similar to ours are Phelan (1994) and Attanasio and Pavoni (2007). The rst stud-
ies how the evolution of consumption inequality generated in a standard agency problem (as
in Phelan and Townsend (1991)) relates to US data.5 The key di¤erence of our paper is the
focus on a Mirrlees environment, which generates jointly the behavior of consumption and
hours worked and using both series allows us to identify the amount of private information.
The second focuses on a moral hazard problem with hidden savings and shows, analyz-
ing equilibrium restrictions, how private information can explain the excess smoothness in
consumption in data from the United Kingdom.
This paper is also related to a recent literature that studies an environment where workers
have access to insurance that is in addition to what is available through precautionary
savings. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2007) study environments where workers are subject to two types of shocks some that are
completely insured, some are entirely uninsured. With respect to these papers, the assets
available in our environment, and hence the level of insurance provided at di¤erent ages, are
determined endogenously.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the environment, section 3 studies
the qualitative implications of the environment, section 4 presents the data, section 5 presents
4Some exceptions are Farhi and Werning (2006), Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006), Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006) and Huggett and Parra (2006).
5Also, Ai and Yang (2007) study an environment with private information and limited commitment that
can account for the elasticity of consumption growth to income growth found in U.S data.
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our estimation strategy and results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Environment
In this section we describe the main features of the environment and dene the optimal
insurance contract between a planner and the workers.
Our environment is a standard dynamic Mirrlees economy similar to Golosov, Kocher-
lakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006). Consider an innite horizon
economy. In every period t a new generation is born and is composed of a continuum of mea-
sure 1 of workers. Each generation lives for a nite number of periods N and every worker
works for T periods, with T < N . Given our focus on the e¤ects of the incentive mechanisms
during the working life, we constrain the analysis to the ages 1 to T . Throughout the paper,
we consider the optimal contract signed by a worker and a planner during working age.6 A
large literature on dynamic optimal contracts considers contracts with innite length. In
our environment, solving a contract with nite length has important implications for the
allocations of consumption, hours, and income, which will be explained in the next section.
In addition to the standard dynamic Mirrlees environment, our environment features
the presence of idiosyncratic public shocks together with idiosyncratic private shocks. This
allows us to study the interaction between the two shocks and, in the quantitative analysis,
the relative importance of each.
Each worker has utility dened over consumption and leisure. Assume that utility is
additively separable over time, and let the period utility function be denoted by
u(c; l) : R2+ ! R: (1)
Assume that u is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and concave in both argu-
ments. Agents discount future utility at the constant rate  < 1. Given a sequence of
consumption and leisure fct; ltgTt=1, the expected discounted utility over the working life is
given by
W fct; ltgTt=1 = E0
TX
t=1
t 1 [u(ct; lt)] ; (2)
6In our environment, there is no moral hazard problem after retirement; hence, retirement can be fully
characterized by the continuation utility assigned at time T denoted by wT . Our approach is to assume that
the planner assigns to each worker the same level of wT . There might be welfare gains from allowing the
planner to choose wT optimally as an additional instrument for providing incentives to agents at time T .
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where E0 denotes the expectation with respect to the information available at age t = 0.
Uncertainty in ages 1; : : : ; T is in the form of labor productivity shocks. At every age, a
worker is subject to two idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, t 2 t and t 2 Ht. Let
t  (1; ::; t) 2 t and t  (1; ::; t) 2 H t denote the histories of the shocks up to age t
. For a given realization of the labor productivity shocks, a worker can produce y units of
e¤ective output according to the following relation:
yt = f(t; t)  lt; (3)
where lt denotes his labor input. Assume f , the total labor productivity, is increasing in each
argument. We assume the labor input is private information of the worker. At every age t,
the worker learns the realizations of his labor productivity shocks t and t. The shock  is
publicly observed by all workers (from now on, we will call it the public shock), while the
shock  is privately observed by the worker (the private shock). Let (T ; T ) denote the
probability of drawing a particular sequence of productivity shocks T and T . We assume
the following
Assumption 1
(a) For every age the public and private shocks are identically and independently distributed
across workers.
(b) The realization of the private shock is independent of the realization of the public shock:
(T ; T ) = (
T )(
T ).
(c) The shocks are independent over age: (
tjt 1) = (t) and (tjt 1) = (t).
The purpose of the second assumption is to isolate the private information nature of the
private shocks, so that nothing can be inferred from the realization of the public shock.
Assumption 3-(c) is for tractability purposes.7 The contribution of private information to
7In section 5.3 we relax this assumption by looking at the e¤ects of a persistent public shock. Adding
serial correlation to the privately observed shock is left for future work. Extending the model along this
direction introduces several obstacles. From a computational point of view, the di¢ culty is in characterizing
the optimal contract given the history dependent reporting strategies that must be considered by the planner
and the lack of common prior on the type of the agent (some of these issues have been addressed in Fernandes
and Phelan (2000) and Doepke and Townsend (2006)). Also, the presence of persistent private information
introduces an additional age varying component in the provision of incentives (besides the one emphasized
in this paper) making the identication of the amount of private information less transparent.
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labor productivity uncertainty is summarized by 
, the fraction of the variance of labor
productivity due to private information,

t =
2t ()
2t () + 
2
t ()
2 [0; 1] . (4)
If 
 = 1, all of the shocks to labor productivity are private information; if 
 = 0, all of the
shocks are public information.
At age t = 1, before any uncertainty is realized, a worker signs an exclusive contract
with a planner that provides insurance against labor productivity shocks over his working
life. We solve for the optimal contract in this environment. Due to the revelation prin-
ciple, we can restrict our study to direct mechanisms in which workers report truthfully
the realization of the productivity shocks to the planner. The contract species, condi-
tional on the realized history of public shock t and the reported history of private shock
t, a level of required e¤ective output and a level for consumption. Denote the contract by
fc; yg = fct
 
t; t

; yt
 
t; t
gTt=1. Note that the planners problem is not subject to any
aggregate uncertainty.
A contract fc; yg is incentive compatible if it satises the following:
TX
t=1
X
t;t
(
t)(
t)t 1u
 
ct
 
t; t

;
yt
 
t; t

f(t; t)
!
 (5)
TX
t=1
X
t;t
(
t)(
t)t 1u
 
ct
 
t; ~t

;
yt
 
t; ~t

f(t; t)
!
; 8 ~t 2 H t:
Note that in our environment, full insurance against productivity shocks is not incentive
compatible. The intuition for this is straightforward if we assume that the period utility is
separable in consumption and leisure. E¢ ciency implies that under full information, highly
skilled workers should work more hours while at the same time all workers should receive
the same consumption allocation independent of the realization of the productivity shocks.
This contract is clearly not incentive compatible in the presence of private information, since
an agent with high productivity shock is better o¤ reporting a low productivity shock. In
appendix A we extend this argument to the case with a nonseparable (Cobb-Douglas) utility
function.
The planner has access to a technology that allows transferring resources linearly over
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time at the constant rate 1=q. A contract fc; yg is feasible if it satises the following:8
TX
t=1
X
t;t
(
t)(
t)qt 1
 
ct
 
t; t
  yt  t; t = 0: (6)
In this environment, the planner o¤ers a contract that solves the following problem:
max
fc;ygTt=0
TX
t=1
X
t;t
(
t)(
t)t 1u
 
ct
 
t; t

;
yt
 
t; t

f(t; t)
!
(7)
s:t: (5) and (6)
2.1 Recursive formulation
To compute the solution to the planners problem, it is convenient to rewrite the above
problem recursively. We write the problem using as a state variable the continuation lifetime
utility, as in Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Green (1987). In addition, instead of solving
the above utility maximization problem, we solve its dual cost minimization problem. To
allow for ex-ante heterogeneity, before any uncertainty is realized, each worker is associated
with a number w0, which denotes his entitlement of discounted lifetime utility. As in Atkeson
and Lucas (1992), we solve the correspondent planners problem for each level of promised
utility w0 for each worker of generation t.
In the recursive formulation we need to distinguish between the problem faced in period
T , when the planner chooses current consumption and output, and all other periods t < T
when the planner chooses current consumption, output, and continuation utility. We refer to
the problem for any t < T as the T   1 problem. From here onward we make the additional
assumption that the private information labor productivity shock can take only two values
per period t 2 fH;t; L;tg with H;t > L;t for all t.9 We also consider the relaxed problem,
only considering incentive compatibility constraints for the agent that draws H . In appendix
B we show that the relaxed problem is equivalent to the original if the utility function is
8This feasibility constraint abstracts from inter-generational transfers.
9The model can be extended to multiple shock values without any e¤ect to the mechanism described
in the next section. This assumption is added for computational reasons, however note that since the
quantitative analysis focus on the variance of the allocation consumption and hours this assumption is not
too restrictive.
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separable over consumption and leisure.10 The period T problem is
ST (w) = min
c;y
X
T
(T )
X
T
(T ) [cT (T ; T )  yT (T ; T )] ; (8)
s:t:
X
T
(T )
X
T
(T )u

cT (T ; T );
yT (T ; T )
f(T ; T )

= w; (9)
u

cT (T ; H);
yT (T ; H)
f(T ; H)

 u

cT (T ; L);
yT (T ; L)
f(T ; H)

; 8T : (10)
The time T   1 problem is
ST 1(w) = min
c;y;w0
X

()
X

()

cT 1(; )  yT 1 (; ) + qST (w0T 1(; ))

; (11)
s:t:
X

()
X

()

u

cT 1(; );
yT 1(; )
f(; )

+ w0T 1(; )

= w; (12)
u

cT 1(; H);
yT 1(; H)
f(; H)

+ w0T 1(; H) 
u

cT 1(; L);
yT 1(; L)
f(; H)

+ w0T 1(; L); 8T 1: (13)
At time 0, when the contract is signed, each individual is characterized by an initial level
of promised utility w0. The value for the planner of delivering the optimal contract is then
given by S1 (w0). In our simulations the distribution of w0, denoted by w(w0); is chosen so
that
P
w0
w(w0)S1 (w0) = 0.
2.2 Optimality conditions
The presence of private information, together with the nonstationarity of the problem, limits
the ability to characterize analytically the optimal allocation. One of the few analytical
results that can be derived relies on applying variational methods to the planner problem.
This approach has been used by Rogerson (1985) and in an environment similar to ours
by Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003). The key result is that it is optimal for
the planner to equate expected marginal cost whenever possible. Equating marginal costs
requires the planner to be able to transfer resources between di¤erent nodes of the contract
in an incentive feasible way (by a node we refer a particular history of labor productivity
10In our numerical simulations with nonseparable utility functions, we solve the relaxed problem and
verify that the solution for this problem satises the constraints of the original problem.
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shocks at a given age). For example, the Euler equation for marginal cost derived by Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) requires the planner at every period t to be able to
transfer resources between all of the states at time t+ 1 and the current period. Since time
is observable, this transfer can be performed in an incentive feasible way.
The presence of a public shock in our environment enables the planner to make transfers
not only between time but also between nodes that are made observable by the presence of
the public shock itself. For example, the planner can equate marginal cost between periods
for every realization of the publicly observable shock and within periods across di¤erent
realizations of the public shock. The following proposition states this result. The additional
assumption needed is separability between consumption and leisure.
Proposition 1 Let U(c; l) = u(c)   v(l). Necessary conditions for an interior optimal
contract are
1
uc
 
c
 
t; t
 = q

X
t+1

 
t+1jt 1
uc
 
c
 
t+1; t+1
 ; 8t+1; t; t; (14)
X
t
 (tjt 1)
uc(c([
t 1; ~t]; t))
=
X
t
 (tjt 1)
uc
 
c
 
t 1; t

; t
 ; 8~t; t; t 1; t 1: (15)
Proof. In appendix C.
A direct implication of (14) is the standard inverse Euler derived by Golosov, Kocherlakota,
and Tsyvinski (2003). This equation implies that current marginal cost is equated to the
expected future marginal cost:
1
uc
 
c
 
t; t
 = q

X
t+1;t+1

 
t+1jt   t+1jt 1
uc
 
c
 
t+1; t+1
 ; 8t; t: (16)
Equation (15) is a novel feature of this environment. It implies that, within a period, the
planner equates the inverse of marginal utility of consumption across di¤erent realizations
of the public shock. If 
 = 0, full insurance is incentive feasible, and equation (15) implies
that marginal utility of consumption (and hence consumption) is constant across all states.
2.3 The role of publicly observed shocks
In this section we determine how consumption is a¤ected by the realization of the public
shock. If 
 6= 0, from equation (15) it is not clear whether the worker is fully insured
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against the realization of the public shock. This is of particular interest, since one of the
tests that can be used to reject Pareto optimal allocations (see, for example, Attanasio and
Davis (1996)) is based on detecting a covariance di¤erent from zero between consumption
and a publicly observable characteristic.
In a environment with separable utility and without private information, consumption
does not depend on the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. The following
proposition shows that when f(; ) =  , in the presence of private information, consump-
tion depends on .
Proposition 2 Assume u(c; l) = u(c)   v(l). Let v(l) = 
1+
l1+ and f(; ) =   . Then
for any allocation fc; yg that solves the relaxed problem, we have c(; ) 6= c(^; ) for all
; ^; :
Proof. In appendix D.
The key intuition for this result is how di¤erent realizations of  can a¤ect the severity of
the incentive problem. Dene the following variable:
() = f (; H)  f (; L) ; 8: (17)
For a given value of , () denotes the e¤ective amount of labor productivity that the
worker with realization H can misreport. This implies that if () varies with , after
a given realization of the public shock, the planner faces a di¤erent incentive problem. In
the proof of the proposition we show that as a consequence, the multiplier on the incentive
compatibility constraint, and hence the level of consumption, depends on . In gure 1-(a)
we illustrate the results of the proposition. The plot displays typical policy function for the
case with f(; ) =   .
On the other hand, if f (; ) =  + , () is independent of . The policy functions for
consumption under this specication are displayed in gure 1-(b). In this case, the allocation
for consumption does not depend on the realization of the public shock.
3 Characterizing the Allocation
In this section we characterize the properties of the cross-sectional moments for consumption
and hours implied by the optimal allocation. Our benchmark parametric form for the utility
10
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Policy functions for consumption with 
 = 0:5. In panel (a) f(; ) = ; in panel (b)
f(; ) =  + .
function is Cobb-Douglas,
u (c; l) =

c (1  l)1 1 
1   ; (18)
where the consumption share is  2 (0; 1) and the curvature parameter is  > 1. The Cobb-
Douglas utility function implies a constant elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure equal to 1. In section 5.3 we also look at utility functions with di¤erent values
for the elasticity of substitution, and with nonconstant elasticity of substitution.
We rst look at the static environment. This will be the starting point in drawing a
connection between the distortions induced by the incentive constraint and the properties of
the allocation for consumption and hours.
3.1 The static allocation
We start with the static Mirrleesian benchmark, setting T = 1.11 With only one period,
the planner can provide incentives only by distorting consumption and hours with respect
to the rst best allocation, what we refer to as the intratemporal margin. The distortion
on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is summarized by the
11For a detailed review of the literature on the static and dynamic Mirrlesian environment, we refer the
reader to Tuomala (1990) and Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006).
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following:.12
 cl (; ) = 1 +
1

ul (c (; ) ; l (; ))
uc (c (; ) ; l (; ))
: (19)
In the full information case e¢ ciency implies that  cl = 0 and hours are set according
to current labor productivity, which induces a volatility of hours directly related to the
volatility of labor productivity. Also consumption is determined equating marginal utility
of consumption across workers. The only source of volatility of consumption depends on the
cross partial derivative of the utility between consumption and leisure.
Table 1: Population statistics for the static environment

 var(c) var(l) E [ cl] cov(c; ) cov(l; )
1 0.067 0.017 0.069 0.060 0.030
0.75 0.052 0.030 0.054 0.050 0.036
0.25 0.023 0.059 0.021 0.032 0.052
0 0.011 0.080 0 0.024 0.065
Cobb-Douglas utility with  = 3,  = 1=3.
When 
 6= 0, due to the cost of providing incentives, it is not optimal for the planner to
induce the full information level of hours. This fact is illustrated in table 1. As 
 increases
from zero, the variance of hours decreases. At the same time the additional rewards to the
skilled agent in implementing the desired level of hours cause the variance of consumption to
increase. The role of incentives is also illustrated in the last two columns of table 1. Looking
at the covariance between consumption and hours with labor productivity, we observe that
the response of consumption increases as 
 increases, while the response of hours decreases.
In this example, di¤erent distortions are achieved by varying 
. In a dynamic environ-
ment, for any xed level of 
 6= 0, we observe that the intratemporal distortion changes with
age and, in particular, increases endogenously over the life cycle.
12The distortion is not independent of the realization of the public shock. In particular, an agent with a
high realization of the public shock will be subject to a higher average distortion.
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3.2 The multi-period allocation
We now look at the dynamic environment and set T = 6.13 From the incentive constraint
(13), we observe that in every period t < T , the planner has at its disposal two instruments
to induce truthful revelation of the high productivity shock: a worker can be rewarded with
high current consumption and leisure and with high future continuation utility. Whenever
possible, it is always optimal to provide incentives using the two instruments. We begin by
looking at the behavior of continuation utility. From the rst order-conditions of the planner
problem, we have the following equations that relate current and future marginal cost for
the planner:
t +
t ()
(H)()
=
q

S 0t+1(w
0
t(; H)); 8; (20)
t   t ()
(L)()
=
q

S 0t+1(w
0
t(; L)); 8; (21)
with t the multiplier on the promised utility constraint (9) and t() the multiplier on
the incentive constraint (10). Equations (20) and (21) determine the evolution of promised
utility. A positive multiplier on the incentive constraint, together with the cost function of
the planner being increasing and convex imply a spreading out of continuation utilities. In
addition, the convexity of the cost function implies that this spreading out is asymmetric.14
The evolution of promised utility for an exante homogeneous population is plotted in gure
2. We observe that the support of promised utility for the population increases over age.
Unlike previous results, due to the nonstationarity of the value function, the spread is fast
in early periods and slows down as the worker ages.
The mechanism in play is the following: since the worker values smoothing of consumption
across time, as he ages, the planner provides insurance substituting progressively from in-
centives provided on the intertemporal margin (rewarding by varying continuation utility) to
incentives provided using the intratemporal (rewarding by varying current consumption and
leisure). This is particularly stark in the last period where only current consumption and
leisure can be used to provide incentives. To illustrate the implications of the nite horizon
e¤ect and di¤erentiate them from the ex post heterogeneity induced in the population, we
13From here onwards, we assume that a period represents a ve-year interval, with the initial period set
at age 25.
14The spreading out of continuation utility has been shown numerically by Phelan and Townsend (1991).
Asymptotic limit results have also been studied by Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992),
Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995), and Phelan (1998).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Support of promised utility by age. In panel (a) 
 = 1; in panel (b) 
 = 12 .
consider the evolution of the allocation and continuation utility for the "average" individ-
ual. That is, for every age we look at a worker with the mean value of promised utility
of the population. We then compute the expected distortion of the intratemporal margin
faced by the worker, as well as the conditional variance of continuation utility for the fol-
lowing period. Figure 3 illustrates this result. In this particular example, the intratemporal
distortion monotonically increases over age by a factor of 3, while the individual variance
of continuation utility monotonically decreases (the same result holds averaging across the
population and qualitatively holds for di¤erent parameter specications). The conditional
variance decreasing over time explains why the total variance of continuation utility grows
at a progressively slower rate. This can be seen by decomposing the total variance by con-
ditioning on current continuation utility:
var(wt+1) = E[var(wt+1jwt)] + var(E(wt+1jwt))
= E[var(w0t)] + var (E(w
0
t)) :
The rst term, as stated, is decreasing while the second one is increasing over age.
The behavior of promised utility a¤ects directly the allocations of consumption and hours.
The increasing variance of promised utility contributes to an increase in the variance of
14
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Panel (a) changes in individual expected intratemporal distortions; panel (b) changes in the
individual variance of continuation utility. 
 = 1. Values are normalized to 1 for age group 25-30.
both over age. However the way incentives are provided has di¤erent implications for the
variance of consumption and hours. As noted in the static environment, a high distortion on
the intratemporal margin causes hours to vary less with changes in labor productivity. This
implies a reduction in the variance of hours as the intratemporal distortion increases. Overall
the nite horizon e¤ect, together with the spreading out of continuation utility, makes the
evolution of the variance of hours a quantitative question. This relation between private
information and the evolution of the inequality consumption and hours over age is at the
basis of our identication strategy described in section 5. In gure 4-(a) we observe that for
small variances of the labor productivity hours, the incentive e¤ect dominates and variance
of hours tends to decrease. For large values of the productivity shock, the spreading out of
continuation utility dominates and variance of hours increases.
The e¤ect on the variance of consumption is unambiguous. As the intratemporal distortion
increases, so does its e¤ect on the variance of consumption.15 The variance of consumption
is increasing over the life cycle due to an increase in the variance of promised utility and
an increase in the intratemporal distortion. In gure 4-(b) we observe that variance of
15The increase in the variance of consumption and the e¤ect on the variance of hours depend on the
assumption that consumption and leisure are complements ( > 1). Under this assumption, the binding
incentive constraints are high productivity agents misreporting as low productivity, which are the constraints
in the relaxed problem we solve.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Panel (a) variance of hours by size of labor productivity shocks; panel (b) variance of consump-
tion by size of labor productivity shocks. Values are normalized to 1 for age group 25-30.
consumption increases over the working life and the increase is convex. The convex increase
in the variance of consumption (which is also robust once we introduce persistence in the
publicly observable component of labor productivity shocks) is a specic prediction of this
environment which is di¤erent from other models of consumption insurance.16
Finally, we look at the relationship between consumption and output. From equation (3)
when f (; ) = , we have that
log y = log  + log  + log l: (22)
When 
 = 1, using the above we obtain
cov(log c; log y) = cov(log c; log ) + cov(log c; log l): (23)
The increasing distortion in the intratemporal margin will cause (as described in section 3.1)
an increase of the covariance between consumption and the privately observed productivity
16In an environment with self-insurance with a single bond, if the income process is persistent, the increase
in the variance of consumption is concave. This comes from the fact that the realization of uncertainty early
in life generates a large heterogeneity in consumption paths early in life. Although the US data displays
a roughly linear increase of variance of consumption, Deaton and Paxson (1994) show that this increase is
convex for the United Kingdom and Taiwan.
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shock (the rst term on the right side of equation (23)). In our numerical simulations we
observe that the second term in (23) is at and slightly decreasing with age; overall the
rst term dominates, increasing the covariance between consumption and output over the
working life. The covariance between c and y over age is plotted in gure 5 for di¤erent
values of the curvature parameter and di¤erent amounts of private information.
Figure 5: Covariances for di¤erent 
 and .
From gure 5 we observe how without private information the covariance between c and
y remains at over age (when 
 = 0 the level of the covariance is set by the total variance
of the uncertainty and by the cross-partial between consumption and leisure in the utility
function). Increasing , through its e¤ect on the cross-partial, increases the level of the
covariance while increasing 
 increases its growth rate.
3.3 Implementation of the optimal allocation
In this paper we focus on the optimal contract derived from a constrained e¢ cient problem
subject to an information friction. By analyzing the data through the lens of our model, our
goal is to verify if the allocation in the data is compatible with the predictions of the model
without taking a stand on how this allocation is actually implemented. Several papers have
proposed decentralizations for environments similar to ours. Prescott and Townsend (1984)
show, for a general class of economies, that a competitive equilibrium in which rms are
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allowed to o¤er history-dependent contracts is Pareto optimal. Following the seminal work
of Mirrlees (1971), the public nance literature has focused on implementing the constrained
optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. In most of the papers follow-
ing this approach the optimal tax schedule used by the government is the only instrument
that provides insurance to the worker. Recent papers in this tradition are Kocherlakota
(2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), which show that in a dynamic environment the opti-
mal allocation can be implemented with a nonlinear income tax that depends on the entire
history of productivity shocks (the former) or on the current productivity shock and wealth
level (the latter). In a similar environment in which the workers disability is unobservable
and permanent, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) show that the constrained e¢ cient alloca-
tion can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with an asset-tested disability policy.
Grochulski (2007) shows that the informational constrained allocation can be implemented
using an institutional arrangement that resembles the US personal bankruptcy code. Fol-
lowing Kocherlakota (1998) and Prescott and Townsend (1984), Kapicka (2007) shows that
the optimal allocation can be decentralized with workers sequentially trading one-period
income-contingent assets.
4 The Data
We use two di¤erent data sources, the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Our main source for consumption expenditures
and hours is the CEX; labor income is taken from the PSID. In order to make the data from
both surveys as comparable as possible, we apply the same sample selection to both. We
consider household heads (reference person in the CEX) as those between ages 25 and 55
who worked more than 520 hours and less than 5096 hours per year and with positive labor
income.17 We exclude households with wage less than half of the minimum wage in any given
year. Table 2 describes the number of households in each stage of the sample selection. All
the nominal data are deated using the consumer price index calculated by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics with base 1982-84=100.
In Table 7 (in appendix F) we present some descriptive statistics from both surveys.18 All the
17By stopping at age 55 we also minimize the discrespancy between consumption expenditure and actual
consumption (due to the progressive larger use of leisure in both preparation and shopping time) highlighted
in Aguiar and Hurst (2005).
18From table 7 we observe that, in the period during which both surveys overlap, they have similar
characteristics. Workers in the CEX sample are on average older and more educated than the PSID sample.
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Table 2: Sample selection for PSID and CEX
PSID CEX
Baseline sample 192,897 69,816
Exclude SEO sample 109,342 NA
Hours restriction 85,811 46,559
Earnings<=0 NA 46,002
Labor income<=0 76,633 45,745
Minimum wage restriction 67,023 43,802
Age >21 and <=55 56,628 36,871
Food<=0 47,757 NA
Final sample 47,757 36,871
Numbers indicate total observations remaining at each stage of the sample selection.
earnings variables and hours refer to the household head, while the expenditure variables
are total household expenditure per adult equivalent.19 The earnings and hours data are
from the 1968-1993 waves of the PSID, corresponding to income earned in the years 1967-
1992. The measure of earnings used includes heads labor part of farm income and business
income, wages, bonuses, overtime, commissions, professional practice, labor part of income
from roomers and boarders or business income. In our benchmark experiment we use hours
worked from CEX.
The consumption data is from the Krueger and Perri CEX dataset for the period 1980
to 2003. In the CEX data our baseline sample is limited to households who responded to all
four interviews and with no missing consumption data. Since the earnings data are annual
and consumption data are measured every quarter during one year, we sum the expenditures
reported in the four quarterly interviews. The consumption measure used includes the sum
of expenditures on nondurable consumption goods, services, and small durable goods, plus
the imputed services from housing and vehicles. The earnings data correspond to total labor
income.
Our focus is on the life cycle moments of consumption, hours, and earnings distribution.
Due to data availability, we construct for each data set a synthetic panel of repeated cross
sections. To derive the life cycle moments of interest, we rst calculate each moment for a
Overall, we conclude that the two data sets are consistent.
19We use the Census denition of adult equivalence.
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particular year/age cell. We include the worker on a "cell" of age a on year t if his reported
age in year t is between a   2 and a + 2. A typical cell constructed with this procedure
contains a few hundred observations with average size of 225 households in the CEX and
318 in the PSID. Following Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005), we control for time
e¤ects when calculating the life cycle moments. Specically we run a linear regression of
each moment in dummies for age and time. The moments used in the estimation, reported
in the graphs that follow, are the coe¢ cients on the age dummies normalized to match the
average value of the moment in the total sample.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Life-cycle proles, source: CEX and PSID. Panel (a) displays the variances of consumption
expenditure and earnings, panel (b) the variances of hours.
In gure 6 we report the cross-sectional variances for consumption, hours, and earnings
over the working life. The rst fact to be noted is the large increase in the variance of
income over the working life (14 log points), consumption increases less (3 log points), while
the variance of hours is roughly constant with a slight decrease over the working life. In
order to compare the two data sets used we plot the cross-sectional variance of hours from
both; we observe that this moment is very similar in both datasets over the ages considered.
In gure 7 we observe that the covariance of hours and consumption does not display any
particular trend, remaining essentially at across the life cycle. We also observe a signicant
increase in the covariance of consumption and earnings.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: Life-cycle proles for covariances, source: CEX and PSID. Panel (a) displays the covariance
between consumption expenditure and hours, panel (b) the covariance between consumption and income.
The dotted lines denote two standard errors introduced when controlling for time e¤ect.
5 Estimation Strategy and Results
In this section we quantitatively assess how the constrained e¢ cient environment described
can account for the working life proles of consumption, hours, and earnings that we ob-
serve in the data. In doing so, we also determine how much private information on labor
productivity we need to introduce to make the model and the data consistent.
Due to the nonlinearity of the optimal contract, it is not possible to separately determine
from equilibrium conditions the size of the private information and the preference parameters.
On the other hand, for any combination of parameters we can solve for the optimal contract
and simulate a population. This enables us to determine preference parameters and 
 using
a minimum distance estimator, minimizing the distance between moments generated by the
model and moments observed in the data. We follow the procedure described in Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) and estimate our model using the method of simulated moments.
Denote by   the vector of parameters to be estimated. From our model we determine
the individual values of consumption, hours, and income as functions of the parameters
and promised utility, denoted respectively by cit(wit; ), lit(wit; ), and yit(wit; ). Our
target moments are the cross-sectional variances of consumption hours and labor income
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by age.20 We denote the cross-sectional variances in the model by 2c;t ( ),
2
l;t ( ),
2
y;t ( ).
From the data we compute the equivalent moments denoted by ^2c;t,^
2
l;t,^
2
y;t. For a given
moment generated from the model we calculate the distance from its empirical counterpart,
gx ( ) = 
2
x ( )  ^2x. Let g ( ) be the vector of length J , where J values of gx are stacked.
The minimum distance estimator for the parameter vector   will be given by
   argmin
 
g ( ) W  g ( )0 ; (24)
where W is a J  J positive semi-denite weighting matrix. Once we obtain the value of  
we compute the properties of the gradient at the minimum determining if any two parameters
are linearly substitutes (or close to). For our benchmark estimation we set W equal to the
identity matrix.
To make the data and the values generated by the model compatible, we scale dollar-
denominated quantities so that the model matches the average consumption value in the
data. Also, the total feasible number of hours of work is set at 5200 per year (approximately
14 hours of work for every day of the year). Throughout the quantitative analysis we x
 = q = 0:9. Our benchmark utility function will be Cobb-Douglas as in equation (18), of
this utility function we estimate the curvature parameter () and the share of consumption
(). We restrict shock to two realizations per period: t;H > t;L for the public shock and
H > L for the private shock. The average value of labor productivity is held constant
(normalized to 1) along the life cycle, but we do allow for an increasing variance for both
private and public shocks. The two shocks are parametrized by the following, for every age
t
t;H   t;L = 2h[1 + gv(t  1)]; (25)
t;H   t;L = 2h[1 + gv(t  1)]: (26)
With this formulation we can determine the evolution of the two shocks with only three
parameters: h, h the magnitude of the shocks at age 25 and gv that denotes how the
variances of the two shocks increase (or decrease if negative) in every age period. This
specication for the shocks enables us also to maintain a constant 
 across the working life,
20Targeting e¤ective hours worked is consistent with our informational assumption. Although in our model
hours are assumed to be non-observable by the planner, since we consider direct truth-telling mechanisms,
the number of hours worked is actually known along the equilibrium path.
22
from equation (4) we have that

t = 
 =
h2
h2 + h
2

: (27)
We introduce heterogeneity at age 25 in the form of heterogeneity in continuation utilities.
We consider at age 25 two distinct groups: the w "rich" group with initial promised utility
given by wH and the w "poor" group with initial promised utility given by wL.. These two
values of w are determined by the parameter  as follows
log(wH) = log(w0)+ log()
log(wL) = log(w0)  log()
where for a given  the value w0 is determined so that the feasibility condition holdsX
i=H;L
S1(wi) = 0: (28)
In our benchmark estimation we will estimate the following 6 parameter f; ; gv; h; h; g.
5.1 Results
In our rst set of results, we focus on the proles of consumption and hours. In particular,
we look at the cross-sectional variance of consumption and at the cross-sectional variance
of hours from ages 25 to 55. In the previous section it was shown how introducing private
information enables us to have an increase in the variance of consumption without increasing
the variance of hours. Hence, looking at these moments, directly exploits the mechanism
induced by private information. Column (1) of table 3 displays the results.
The model is locally identied (the gradient of the score function (24) at the minimum
has full rank). The value of 
 needed to generate the observed increase in inequality in
consumption is 0:99; all of the labor productivity shocks are private information of the
worker.21 Estimation results are further discussed in section 5.2. The curvature parameter
() and the share of consumption () in the utility function are, respectively, 1:46 and 0:69.
This implies a value of risk aversion equal to 1:32 and a value for the Frisch elasticity of
leisure equal to 0:90.22 With the value of elasticity of leisure , we can approximate the
21The di¤erence in the value of the score function for values of 
=0.99 and 
=1 is within numerical
rounding.
22The implied coe¢ cient of risk aversion is  = 1  +  and the Frisch elasticity of leisure  = =.
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Table 3: Benchmark estimation
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
; q 0:9 0:9 0:9 0:9 0:9
 1:46 1:27 3:88 1:59 1:42
 0:69 0:67 1
3
0:46 0:49
gv  0:0073  0:014  0:001  0:006 0
 1:22        

 0:99 0:99 1 1 1
Results: benchmark estimation (1), results without heterogeneity in w (2), xing  = 1=3 (3), targeting
mean hours (4), xing gv = 0 (5). Note: values of  and q are held xed. For columns (2) to (5) only the
increase in the variance of consumption is targeted
Frisch elasticity of labor supply by multiplying  by 1 

, the resulting value is then equal
to 0:40. This value is well within the common estimates in the labor literature (refer to
Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) table 3.3). In addition, the value of gv is close to
zero and negative; thus, the total variance of labor productivity decreases (slightly) over age.
Figure 8 displays the t of the model with respect to the targeted moments.
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Benchmark environment t on matched moments.
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The benchmark environment successfully accounts for the level and the increase in the vari-
ance of consumption during the working life. In gure 8-(a) we plot the prole for the
variance of consumption; the increase of the prole, as described in the previous section, is
convex. Figure 8-(b) displays the level for the variance of hours. The model also captures
the level and the slightly decreasing pattern in the cross-sectional variance (in the data,
hours decrease by 0:004 and by 0:006 in the model). As shown in Bound, Brown, Duncan,
and Rodgers (1994), hours are subject to a large measurement error. This can introduce an
upward bias in the estimate of the magnitude of labor productivity shocks. In section 5.3,
we try and control for the measurement error for the variance of hours.
In section 3 we showed how the nite horizon nature of the problem induces an increase
in the distortion of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure over
the working life . We now look at how this quantity evolves in the data. From (19) for the
Cobb-Douglas utility function we have
 cl = 1  1

1  

c
L  l ; (29)
where L = 5200. In the data we calculate this quantity under the assumption that imputed
hourly wages are equal to the marginal productivity of the worker (the product of the two
skill shocks).23 When calculating how the value of  cl evolves over the ages 25-55 we ob-
serve that two factors are important: family composition and the denition of consumption
(including or not housing). Our benchmark calculation of  cl, plotted in gure 9, considers
only single households and does not include services imputed from housing in the denition
of consumption.24 We observe that  cl clearly displays an increasing trend over age in the
data.
The growth rate of  cl is decreasing in . For the benchmark estimation ( = 0:69),
for ages up to 40-45,  cl in the model increases at the same rate as  cl in the data. After
that, the model overestimates the increase as shown in gure 9-(b). Moving to a lower value
of  increases the growth rate of  cl in the data as shown in gure 9-(a). This moment is
of particular interest since any market setting, where workers equate the marginal utility
of consumption to the marginal disutility of leisure as an exogenously incomplete markets
model with endogenous labor, displays a at prole for  cl. The only way to induce an
23By doing so, we are not taking into account incentives provided through wages.
24By restricting the sample to single households we do not have to consider the joint decision of hours
worked within a household. This joint decision might have signicant e¤ect when calculating  cl since it
includes ratios of marginal utility.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: Evolution of the average distortion on the marginal of substitution between consumption and
leisure over age.
increase in this quantity is by introducing individual taste shocks in the value of  that
increase in variance as the worker age (as for example in Badel and Huggett (2006)).
Finally, we look at how large are the transfers needed to implement the constrained
e¢ cient allocation. In the model this quantity can be calculated directly by looking at
the di¤erences between output produced and the consumption level. This transfer has no
direct equivalent in the data, being the sum of multiple observable (change in asset position,
transfer income) and unobservable quantities (transfers within the rm). We can, however,
get a measure that approximates these transfers from the PSID.25 Figure 10 shows the
relation between these two variables. Overall, the transfers needed to implement are higher
but not too distant from what can be measured in the data, particularly considering that
the measure constructed from the data is a lower bound of the actual transfers taking place
between workers.
25The PSID for the years 1969 to 1985 continuously reports any additional transfer income the house-
hold received during the previous year. This variable includes transfers from publicly funded programs
(food stamps, child nutrition programs, supplemental feeding programs, supplemental social security in-
come, AFDC, earned income tax credit) and transfers received by family and nonfamily members. In our
sample, 24% of the household-year observation received a transfer, and in total 67% of the households re-
ceived a transfer at some time. These transfers are signicant, averaging $1930 (1983 dollars) and account
for 70% to 90% of total food expenditures.
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Figure 10: Transfers over age.
In table 3 we report some initial robustness checks. We rst look at the e¤ect of setting
the initial heterogeneity in w equal to zero ( = 0) (column (2)). The environment without
initial heterogeneity cannot account for the entire level in the heterogeneity in consumption,
so in this test we only look at the increase in the variance of consumption over age.26 For
the remaining cases, we keep  = 0. We next look at the e¤ect of xing a lower share of
consumption in the utility function (column (3)). We target average hours worked (column
(4)) and restrict to a stationary process for labor productivity, xing gv = 0 (column (5)).
All the cases conrm that shocks to labor productivity are entirely private information. In
column (3) of table 4, we observe that for a value of  = 1=3, only 60% of the increase in
the cross-sectional variance for consumption is accounted for. The value of  is important
for its e¤ect on the average hours worked; targeting this additional moment determines a
level of  = 0:46. With this additional restriction we account for 75% of the cross-sectional
increase in the variance of consumption (column (4) in tables 3 and 4). Section 5.3 considers
additional robustness checks.
5.2 Discussion
To understand why the minimum distance estimator returns a high value for 
, we rst
consider the implications for the proles of the variances of consumption and hours when
26A similar limitation is also discussed in Phelan (1994).
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 is equal to zero. In this case, we can solve directly for these moments. The problem is
characterized by the following rst-order conditions:
uc (c () ; l ()) =  1

ul (c () ; l ()) ; 8; (30)
uc (c () ; l ()) =
1

; 8; (31)
where  is the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint. In the Cobb-Douglas case from
(30) and taking logs,
ln c = ln  + ln

1   + ln

1  y


; (32)
similarly, from (31) we have
ln c = ln+ ln+  (1  ) ln c + (1  ) (1  ) ln

1  y


: (33)
Combining the previous two equations, we get
V ar [ln c] = (  1)2 V ar [ln ] ; (34)
V ar [ln c] = (  1)2V ar [ln ] ; (35)
where  = 1 +

is the Frisch elasticity of leisure. From the same set of equations we can
solve for leisure, obtaining
V ar [ln (1  l)] = 2V ar [ln ] ; (36)
V ar [ln (1  l)] = 2V ar [ln ] : (37)
From equations (35) and (37), we observe that any increase in the variance of consumption is
followed by an increase in the variance of hours.27 This feature highlights the di¢ culty of a
full information insurance environment in describing the prole of consumption and hours.28
In our environment, private information is necessary to provide an increasing variance in
consumption while at the same time keeping the variance of hours constant.
We now provide some intuition on the values obtained for the preference parameters. In
the minimization procedure starting, for example, from an initial guess of ( = 3,  = 1
3
),
27If the amount of time devoted to leisure is greater than hours worked, we have that V ar [ln (l)] >
V ar [ln (1  l)].
28This result is also robust to di¤erent values of the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure, as shown in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001).
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we observe that the minimization path ultimately progresses, decreasing risk aversion and
increasing the elasticity of leisure (decreasing  and increasing ), for the following reasons.
For a given level of uncertainty, a high elasticity of leisure makes the spread in hours at
the optimum larger. This translates, in the presence of private information, to a more
severe moral hazard problem; which implies larger distortions on both the intratemporal
and inter-temporal margin causing a larger spreading out of consumption and continuation
utility. Also, a low value of risk aversion, although reducing the need to provide insurance,
increases the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, making it less costly to the planner
to provide incentives intertemporally. The additional tension that determines the value of
the risk aversion and elasticity is given by the cross-partial derivative between consumption
and leisure. As  approaches 1 the cross-partial tends to zero, and as the complementarity
between consumption and leisure decreases, it becomes more costly for the planner to induce
variation in consumption, since now the rst best level of consumption is constant.
We now want to determine how precisely the moments chosen for the estimation proce-
dure can estimate the amount of private information.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Surface plot of score function for benchmark estimation (a); Criterion function for benchmark
estimation with respect to 
 (b).
In gure 11-(a) we plot the values of the score function (24) as a function of  () and
(). The minimum is obtained at the lower right corner marked by the "x". The lines
are isocurves denoting how the function increases from the minimum. Lines closer together
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denote a steeper change. For each point in the graph, the distance from the origin denotes
the total variance of the shock, while the angular distance from the horizontal axis denotes
the amount of public information. The "x" being close to the horizontal axis denotes an
estimate of almost all private information for the skill shock . What we observe is that the
total variance is estimated more precisely than the value of 
: the score function displays
a semi circular ridge at a constant distance from the origin, this determines the variance of
the skill shock; within this ridge the score function is more at (fewer isocurves) although it
displays a minimum at the estimated value of 
 close to 1.
In gure 11-(b) we plot the criterion function with respect to 
. Each point in this curve
is generated by keeping the value of 
 xed and estimating all of the remaining parameters.
What we observe is that, as expected, the minimum is close to 1. However the criterion
function rises slowly as we move away from 1. This indicates that the moments chosen are
sensitive to increases of 
 as we move away from the full information case (
 = 1) but
become less responsive as we move to higher values of 
. These results suggest that a large
value for 
 is necessary for the model to be consistent with data, although a point estimate
is likely to be imprecisely estimated.
5.3 Robustness checks
In this section we look at additional robustness checks.
Optimal weighting matrix
The estimation in the previous section was performed using the identity matrix as a weighting
matrix in the minimization criterion. We performed the same estimation using an optimal
weighting matrix. We adopt a continuously updated optimal weighting matrix as described
in Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996). In this case the weighting matrix is evaluated at
each iteration during the minimization procedure from the variance-covariance matrix of the
simulated moments. The parameters are now determined by
   argmin
 
g ( ) W ( ) 1  g ( )0
s:t: W ( ) = E

g ( )  g ( )0 :
The parameter results are reported in column (6) of table 5. A summary of the t of the
model is displayed in table 4. With respect to the benchmark estimation, the optimal matrix
puts more weight on moments early in life than on moments later in life. Also the variance
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of consumption is weighted more than the variance of hours. Overall, the di¤erences with
respect to the benchmark estimation are small.
Table 4: Summary of moments
(1) (2) (3) (4) Data
var(c) 0:0287 0:017 0:0214 0:0238 0:0285
var(l)  0:0062 0:0058  0:0036 0:0022  0:004
cov(c; l) 0:0045 0:002  0:0031  0:001  0:0004
E [l] 2960 1540 2124 2244 2123
(5) (6) (7) (8) Data
var(c) 0:0284 0:0281 0:025 0:0258 0:0285
var(l)  0:01  0:0013  0:003  0:006  0:004
cov(c; l) 0:0049 0:0048 0:0021 0:0035  0:0004
E [l] 2132 2831 2564 3119 2123
Summary moments: benchmark estimation (1), results xing  = 1=3 (2), result targeting mean hours (3),
results xing gv = 0 (4), with persistence of the public shock (5), using optimal weighting matrix (6), using
general CES utility function (7), controlling for measurement error in hours (8).
General CES utility function
The Cobb-Douglas utility function restricts the elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure () to 1. We relax this implicit constraint by looking at the more general
CES utility function,
u (c; l) =
[c + (1  ) (1  l) ] 1 
1   ; (38)
where now  = 1
1  . The results are in column (7) of tables 4 and 5. In the estimation,
given the di¢ culty in crossing the value corresponding to  = 1, we estimate starting from
each region with  > 1 and  < 1. The point estimate for the elasticity of substitution is
 = 1:08. Since this value is close to 1; there are no signicant changes with respect to the
Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Controlling for measurement error
In section 5 we used the level of the cross-sectional variance of hours as a target moment.
However, the presence of measurement error can bias the level upward. To control for this
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e¤ect, we reestimate the benchmark environment by cutting the cross-sectional variance of
hours by 30%.29 The results are in column (8) of tables 4 and 5.
Allowing persistence of the public shock
So far we have assumed that the labor productivity process is independent over age. We relax
this assumption by introducing persistence in the public component of labor productivity. We
model the public shock with a two state Markov chain. The transition matrix is bistochastic,
and the probability of remaining in the same state is given by . We also introduce ex-ante
heterogeneity in the population by di¤erentiating workers by their initial seed. As in the
previous section, we target the cross-sectional variance of consumption and hours. The results
are shown in table 5, column (5). Introducing persistence on the public shock has a large
e¤ect on the estimated composition of the labor productivity shocks: the point estimate
for the value of 
 is now equal to :79, the estimated value for  is 0:99, indicating that
public shocks to labor productivity are permanent. We interpret this result as a supportive
argument for the importance of private information shocks: even when the only shock allowed
to have serial correlation is the public one, we still require a signicant fraction of the shock
to be privately observed.
Separable utility function and income variance
The Cobb-Douglas utility function used in the benchmark estimation limits the ability to
independently vary risk aversion and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. We also performed
the estimation with the following utility function:
u(c; l) = 
c1 
1    
l1+l
1 + l
: (39)
This specication is commonly used in the labor literature.30 The coe¢ cient of risk aversion
is given by  and 1=l is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. With this specication we also
target the cross-sectional variance of income. In order to interpret e¤ective output in the
model as labor income, we need to assume that labor markets are perfectly competitive and
workers are paid their marginal productivity. The parametersestimates are given in table
5, column (9). The t of the model is displayed in gures 12 and 13.
Overall, the model captures the evolution of the cross-sectional moments over the life
cycle. The high value of the growth rate of the variance of labor productivity (gv = 0:117),
29Using the PSID validation study, Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1994) nd a signal to noise
ratio for the variance of hours ranging from :2 to :3.
30See Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
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Table 5: Parameter estimates, robustness checks
Parameter (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
 0:47 0:64 0:56 1:27 0:83
 2:84 1:46 1:77 0:681 0:82
l         1:66
gv 0:007  0:005  0:007  0:008 0:12
         1:13
     0:0725    
 0:99        

 0:79 1 0:98 1 0:99
Parameter estimates with persistence of public shock (5), using optimal weighting matrix (6), using general
CES utility function (7), controlling for measurement error in hours (8), alternative utility function (9).
needed to match the increase in the variance of income, causes the model to overshoot the
variance of consumption at age 55. Also the variance of hours is slightly increasing and
underestimated early in the working life.
5.4 The response of consumption to income shocks
Under the assumption that workers are paid at their marginal productivity, we can also study
how consumption responds to income changes. This measure, which has been extensively
studied, reects the insurance possibilities of workers against income uctuations and has
important policy implications.31 In particular, Kaplan and Violante (2008) show that a
calibrated version of a Bewley economy is not compatible with the degree of consumption
insurance observed in the US data. We compute the response of consumption growth to
income growth (2) from the following regression:32
 log cit = 1 + 2 log y
i
t + controls: (40)
We compute the value of 2 from the CEX data using an OLS and instrumental variable
estimation as in Dynarski and Gruber (1997). Results are in table 6. We perform the same
31See Kaplan and Violante (2008) and references therein.
32As controls we use: change in family composition (including: marital status, number of babies, kids
and number of adults in the households), a quartic in age and dummies for the month and for quarter of the
interview.
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(a) (b)
Figure 12: Estimation results for utility given in equation (39): panel (a) variance of consumption; panel
(b) variance of hours.
estimation on panel data generated by the model. For our baseline environment with non
separable utility, we nd a value of 2 equal to 0:107 which falls within our estimates using
OLS and IV on CEX data.33 A more stark interpretation of the link between 2 and the
level of insurance available to workers can be derived in an environment with separable
utility. In this case, if workers are fully insured against income shocks, the value of 2
is 0 (marginal utility of consumption is held constant). In our environment with private
information and separable preferences 2 is equal to 0:067, which emphasizes the limited
insurance possibilities available to workers.
33Gervais and Klein (2006) show that the standard IV estimates overstates the true value 2. Using a
projection method they estimate in the CEX a value of 2 = 0:1. Also note, Ai and Yang (2007), in an
environment with private information and limited commitment, nd a value of 2 = 0:269.
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Figure 13: Estimation results for utility given in equation (39): variance of earnings.
Table 6: Consumption response to income shocks
Source 2
Data - OLS 0:028 (:004)
Data - IV 0:177 (:021)
Data - IV-20% 0:134 (:018)
Model - separable 0:067
Model - non separable 0:107
Estimation of 2 using OLS, instrumental variables (IV) and instrumental variables removing changes in
income smaller than 20% (IV-20%). Source: CEX data and authors calculations..
Finally we look at a particular prediction of our environment. The model predicts that
the value of 2 should be increasing in age due to the progressive importance given to
within period incentives. We calculate this statistic with the same restriction imposed to
generate picture 9 (restricting to single household and removing services from housing from
consumption). Figure 14 displays the result. The value of 2 is increasing in age up to age
40-45 as predicted by the model. The pattern is less clear (and with large standard errors)
as we approach the retirement age.
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Figure 14: Estimation of 2 by age. Source: CEX.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that household data for the U.S. can be rationalized as the outcome
of an environment where risk sharing is e¢ cient but limited by the presence of private
information. We estimate a dynamic Mirrleesian economy and show that it can account
for the evolution of inequality of consumption and hours over the working life when labor
productivity shocks are entirely private information of the worker. We characterize the nite
horizon optimal contract and show how the provision of incentives di¤ers along the life cycle:
early in life continuation utility plays an important role in providing incentives, later in life
intratemporal distortions on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure become more important.
The result of this paper suggests that private information is quantitatively an important
friction when studying risk sharing. This provides strong supporting evidence for recent
papers that study the asset pricing implications of constrained e¢ cient allocation with private
information as in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009) and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2007).
Accounting for the presence of private information in the data can have strong implications
for designing policies that address inequality, redistribution and insurance. For example, the
welfare gains from policies that reduce inequality in an economy in which workers can trade
a single bond can be quite large. However in our environment, any policy that addresses
inequality without recognizing the role of incentives introduced by the presence of private
36
information can potentially be welfare decreasing.
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Appendix
A Incentives and Nonseparability
In this section we show that the full information allocation is not incentive compatible for
the environment with Cobb-Douglas utility:
u (c; l) =

c (1  l)1 1 
1   :
For separable utility functions the result is straightforward given that the rst best alloca-
tion requires constant consumption but not constant output across individuals with di¤erent
skills. With a Cobb-Douglas utility function if  > 1, consumption and labor are Frisch
complements (the cross-partial derivative ucl > 0). This implies that in the rst best alloca-
tion, a worker with high productivity works more but also consumes more. We show that if
faced with the full information allocation, a high-skill worker is better o¤ lying and receiving
the allocation of a low-skill agent. That is u

c(H);
y(H)
H

< u

c(L);
y(L)
H

. Recall that
for the Cobb-Douglas utility we have
uc (c; l) =

c
(1  )u (c; l) ; (41)
ul (c; l) =  1  
1  l (1  )u (c; l) : (42)
From the rst-order conditions (30) and (31) we have
(1  l()) = (1  )

c()

; 8; (43)
c(L) = c(H)

L
H
 (1 )(1 )
 
: (44)
Using (43) we can rewrite the utility function as
u (c(); l()) =

c()

(1 )

1 1 
1   =
c()1 

(1 )

(1 )(1 )
1   :
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Substituting (44) in the above for  = L,
u (c(L); l(L)) =
c(H)
1 

(1 )
L
(1 )(1 ) 
L
H
 (1 )(1 )2
 
1   =
=
24c(H)1  (1  )

(1 )(1 )
1
L
 (1 )(1 )


1
H
 (1 )(1 )2
 
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1  
=
"
c(H)
1 

(1  )

(1 )(1 )
H
L
 (1 )(1 )


1
H
(1 )(1 )#
1
1  
= u (c(H); l(H))

H
L
 (1 )(1 )

: (45)
By assumption 0 <

H
L
 (1 )(1 )

< 1. This implies that u

c(H);
y(H)
H

< u

c(L);
y(L)
L

:
Given that  > 1, u (c(H); l(H)) and u (c(L); l(L)) are both negative. From this result it
follows that
u

c(H);
y(H)
H

< u

c(L);
y(L)
L

< u

c(L);
y(L)
H

: (46)
Hence, the rst best allocation is not incentive-compatible for the worker with high produc-
tivity shock.
B Relaxed Recursive Problem
In this section we justify our use of the relaxed recursive formulation described in section
2.1. Denote the original maximization problem by (P1).
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ST (w) = min
c;y
X
T
(T )
X
T
(T ) [cT (T ; T )  yT (T ; T )] ; (47)
s:t:
X
T
(T )
X
T
(T )u

cT (T ; T );
yT (T ; T )
f(T ; T )

= w; (48)
u

cT (T ; H);
yT (T ; H)
f(T ; H)

 u

cT (T ; L);
yT (T ; L)
f(T ; H)

; 8T ; (49)
u

cT (T ; L);
yT (T ; L)
f(T ; L)

 u

cT (T ; H);
yT (T ; H)
f(T ; L)

; 8T : (50)
The time T   1 problem is
ST 1(w) = min
c;y;w0
X

()
X

()

cT 1(; )  yT 1 (; ) + qST (w0T 1(; ))

; (51)
s:t:
X

()
X

()

u

cT 1(; );
yT 1(; )
f(; )

+ w0T 1(; )

= w; (52)
u

cT 1(; H);
yT 1(; H)
f(; H)

+ w0T 1(; H) 
u

cT 1(; L);
yT 1(; L)
f(; H)

+ w0T 1(; L); 8T 1; (53)
u

cT 1(; L);
yT 1(; L)
f(; L)

+ w0T 1(; L) 
u

cT 1(; H);
yT 1(; H)
f(; L)

+ w0T 1(; H); 8T 1: (54)
Let the relaxed maximization problem be the original problem without constraints (50) and
(54). Denote it by (P2).
Proposition 3 Assume u(c; l) = u(c)   v(l) with v a convex function, then any allocation
fc; yg that solves (P2) also solves (P1).
Proof. Let the allocation fc; yg be a solution to (P2) and suppose it does not satisfy (54)
for some T 1. Then
u (cT 1(; H))  v

yT 1(; H)
f(; L)

+ w0T 1(; H) >
u (cT 1(; L))  v

yT 1(; L)
f(; L)

+ w0T 1(; L): (55)
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We know that any allocation that solves (P2) must have (13) holding with an equality.
Substituting this constraint in the previous equation we get
v

yT 1(; H)
f(; H)

  v

yT 1(; H)
f(; L)

> v

yT 1(; L)
f(; H)

  v

yT 1(; L)
f(; L)

;
v

yT 1(; H)
f(; H)

  v

yT 1(; L)
f(; H)

>

yT 1(; H)
f(; L)

  v

yT 1(; L)
f(; L)

: (56)
Since v is convex, then for any " > 0; x > x^ we have
v(x)  v (x  ") > v(x^)  v (x^  ") ;
v(x)  v (x  ") > v(x^)  v

x^  " f(; L)
f(; H)

:
Let x  yT 1(;H)
f(;L)
; x^  yT 1(;H)
f(;H)
and "  yT 1(;H) yT 1(;L)
f(;L)
then:
v

yT 1(; H)
f(; L)

  v

yT 1(; L)
f(; L)

> v

yT 1(; H)
f(; H)

  v

yT 1(; L)
f(; H)

:
Contradicting (56). Hence any allocation that solves (P2) also solves the original problem
(P1). The same proof holds for the time T problem.
C Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof follows Rogerson (1985) closely. Considering the planners problem
as allocating utility levels to workers, let u(; ) = u(c(; )) be the utility derived from
consumption in state (; ). Let C (u) be the cost for the planner of providing utility
level u. To show (14), consider the following perturbation of the optimal contract u.
For some t 2 H and some t+1 2 , let u(t; [t 1; t]) = u(t; [t 1; t])    and
u(

t; t+1

; t+1) = u(

t; t+1

; t+1)+= for all t and u(t; [t 1; ~t]) = u
(t; [t 1; ~t])
and u([t; ~t+1]; t+1) = u([
t; ~t+1]; 
t+1) for t 6= ~t and for t+1 6= ~t+1. The labor allo-
cations are left unchanged. This contract is still incentive compatible given that the time
and the shock  is publicly observed. This contract minimizes the cost for the planner if the
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following holds:
lim
!0
@
@
24C 0  u  t; t + qX
t+1

 
t+1jtC u  t+1; t+1+ 

35 = 0; (57)
which implies
C 0
 
u
 
t; t

=
q

X
t+1

 
t+1jtC  u  t+1; t+1 : (58)
Equation (14) then follows given that C 0
 
u
 
t; t

= 1
uc(c(t;t))
. To show (15) we proceed
in a similar way. At any given period t, consider two t; ~t 2 ; for all t and t 1 let
u(

t=1; t

; t) = u(

t=1; t

; t)    and u([t=1; ~t]; t) = u([t=1; ~t]; t) + . For
all the remaining histories, the labor allocations are unchanged. This perturbation of the
optimal contract does not a¤ect incentives of the worker, since the transfers  are contingent
on observables and the total utility of the worker is unchanged. Optimality of this contract
requires
lim
!0
@
@
24X
t

 
tjt 1C(u([t 1; ~t]; t) ) +X
t

 
tjt 1C 0(u  t 1; t ; t+)
35 = 0:
(59)
Equation (15) then follows fromX
t

 
tjt 1C 0(u([t 1; ~t]; t)) =X
t

 
tjt 1C 0(u  t 1; t ; t); 8~t; t: (60)
D Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is a  so that c(; ) = c(^; ). Let  = H , from the rst
order conditions for c
u0(c(; H)) [()(H) +  ()] = ()(H); 8:
This implies that  () = (^) =  and c(; L) = c(^; L) (If we assume in the contradicting
assumption that c(; L) = c(^; L), we also get that  () = (^) =  and c(; H) =
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c(^; H).) From the rst-order conditions (FOCs) for w
0(; )
()(H)+  = ()(H)qS
0
T (w
0(; H)); 8;
()(L)   = ()(L)qS 0T (w0(; L)); 8:
This implies
w0(; H) = w
0(^; H); w
0(; L) = w
0(^; L): (61)
From the FOCs for y(; H)
1
H
v0

y(; H)
H

[()(H) + ] =  ()(H); 8;
1
H
v0

y(; H)
H

=
1
^H
v0
 
y(^; H)
^H
!
:
Using the parametric form for the utility function, this equation implies
y(; H)

(H)
1+ =
y(^; H)

(^H)
1+
: (62)
From the FOCs for y(; L)
()(L)
L
v0

y(; L)
L

  
H
v0

y(; L)
H

=  ()(L); 8;
()(L)
L
v0

y(; L)
L

  
H
v0

y(; L)
H

=
(^)(L)
^L
v0
 
y(^; L)
^L
!
  
^H
v0
 
y(^; L)
^H
!
;
y(; L)

1+

()(L)
1+L
  
1+H

=
y(^; L)

^
1+
 
(^)(L)
1+L
  
1+H
!
:
This implies
y(; L)

(H)
1+ =
y(^; L)

(^H)
1+
: (63)
Since the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint is strictly positive, this equation
holds with equality for each . Summing the incentive-compatibility constraint for both ,
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using (61) and the fact that the consumption is independent of  we have
v
 
y(^; H)
^H
!
  v

y(; H)
H

= v
 
y(^; L)
^H
!
  v

y(; L)
H

;
y(^; H ; w)
+1
(^H)
1+
  y(; H ; w)
+1
(H)
1+ =
y(^; L; w)
+1
(^H)
1+
  y(; L; w)
+1
(H)
1+ :
Substituting in this expression equations (62) and (63)
y(^; H)
+1
(^H)
1+
  y(^; H)
+1
(^H=H)
(1+)2

1
(H)
1+ =
y(^; L)
+1
(^H)
1+
  y(^; L)
+1
(^H=H)
(1+)2

1
(H)
1+ ;
y(^; H)
+1
0@ 1
(^H)
1+
  1
(^H=H)
(1+)2

1
(H)
1+
1A =
y(^; L)
+1
0@ 1
(^H)
1+
  1
(^H=H)
(1+)2

1
(H)
1+
1A :
So that
y(^; H) = y(^; L): (64)
Note that the above, together with c(H) > c(L), w
0(H) > w
0(L) (these relations come
from the FOCs and  > 0), implies:
u (c(H))  v

y(; H)
L

+ w0(H) > u (c(L))  v

y(; L)
L

+ w0(L):
Hence, the allocation does not satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint for an agent
with a low private shock. This implies that there is some allocation fc; yg that solves the
relaxed problem (P2) and violates the incentive-compatibility constraint for the low agent.
This is a contradiction to Proposition 3. A similar proof holds for the time T problem.
E Numerical Procedure
Computing the solution to the dynamic moral hazard environment described in this paper
presents two di¢ culties: the problem is nonstationary and the incentive constraints introduce
a nonconvexity in the programming problem. We adopt a computation procedure similar
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to the procedure developed in Phelan and Townsend (1991). A key di¤erence is in how the
possible nonconvexities in the problem are dealt with. Phelan and Townsend (1991) conne
the allocation on a grid and allow the planner to choose lotteries on such allocations. This
procedure transforms the dynamic program in a linear programming problem. The use of
lotteries in our environment makes the computing problem quickly intractable due to the
presence of nonseparable preferences (the lottery in this case has to be dened on the joint
distribution of consumption and leisure) and due to the heterogeneity of individuals, so that
a lottery has to be computed not only for every age but also for every realization of the public
and private shock. Our approach does not rely on lotteries. We do not impose any grid on the
allocation and restrict the planner to only choose degenerate lotteries. This restriction is not
binding. Our theoretical justication is based on the works of Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) and
Kehoe, Levine, and Prescott (2002), which show that in many moral hazard environments
under the assumption of nonincreasing risk aversion, the use of lotteries is not optimal. Our
environment with separable utility (or inelastic labor) falls directly in this category. When
the utility is nonseparable, we cannot show that lotteries will not be optimal. In this case
we verify ex post if the allocation can be improved with the use of lotteries.
(a) (b)
Figure 15: Results allowing for randomization in the Cobb-Douglas case with 
 = 1; panel (a) shows the
probability distribution for a single allocation (e¤ective output for l); panel (b) displays the values of the
joint probability distribution on all the allocation for a given age.
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To determine if the use of lotteries is optimal we rst compute our solution without
lotteries, then include the solution found on an equally spaced grid of consumption, hours
and e¤ective output. The results are shown in gure 15. We observe that the probability
chosen is single peaked at the optimum allocation found without lotteries and quickly (the
graphs are in log scale) falls into numerical noise.
We now describe the steps taken to solve the environment and to compute the moments
used in the estimation.
1. (Obtain the policy functions) The rst step is to derive the policy functions of the
problem described in section 2.1. We solve the problem iterating backward, starting
from the last period T , in our case T = 7. Given that we do not know the ex post
evolution of the state variable w (promised utility), we solve the problem for time T on
a grid of possible w for each value of w. The system of equations given by the rst-order
condition is solved using the Newton method and using as a guess the solution of the
equivalent full information problem (this improves e¢ ciency of the computation and
stability over a wide range of parameters of the utility). Having solved for the optimal
policy function, we compute the value function of the planner ST and its numerical
derivatives. The rst derivatives are computed using a two-sided di¤erence formula,
second derivatives using a three-point formula. Moving backward in time in period
T   1, we repeat the above procedure using the computed values of ST to determine
the allocation for time T   1. Whenever necessary, we interpolate ST using a cubic
spline interpolation. The procedure described is repeated for all the periods T 1; :::; 1.
2. (Simulate the population) With the policy functions we can simulate our panel. For
each age we determine the value of consumption, hours, and e¤ective labor using a
cubic spline on the policy functions. In our benchmark (T = 6) we simulate every
possible history of labor productivity for the individuals. Given the possibility of four
di¤erent realizations of the uncertainty for every age, the panel generated contains a
total of 4T individuals. When we allow for initial heterogeneity in w0, we construct
a panel for each value of w0. We set w0 so that aggregate feasibility holds, that is
S1 (w0) = 0. In the case of time zero heterogeneity in w0, the previous condition
becomes
P
w0
S1 (w0) = 0.
3. (Estimate) In the nal step we compute the same statistics on the articial panel as
in the data. The estimation procedure requires minimizing the distance between data
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moments and articial moments. The minimization is performed using the Nelder-
Mead simplex algorithm. As described in Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright (1998)
this method does not guarantee convergence to the minimum. Our heuristic approach
in assuring that we have in fact reached a minimum is the following: restarting the
minimization procedure from the minimum found and starting from a di¤erent initial
point in the simplex.
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